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Fair Division with Bounded Sharing
Erel Segal-Halevi∗
Abstract
A set of objects is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive
utility-functions. If the objects cannot be shared, so that each of them must be entirely allocated
to a single agent, then fair division may not exist. How many objects must be shared between
two or more agents in order to attain a fair division?
The paper studies various notions of fairness, such as proportionality, envy-freeness and
equitability. It also studies consensus division, in which each agent assigns the same value
to all bundles — a notion that is important for truthful fair division mechanisms. It proves
upper bounds on the number of required sharings. However, it shows that finding the minimum
number of sharings is NP-hard even for generic instances.
Many problems remain open.
1 Introduction
What is a fair way to allocate objects without monetary transfers?
When the objects are indivisible, it may be impossible to allocate them fairly — consider a
single object and two people. A common approach to this problem is to look for an approximately-
fair allocation. There are several definitions of approximate fairness, the most common of which
are envy-freeness except one object (EF1) and maximin share (MMS). An alternative solution is to
“make objects divisible” by allowing randomization and ensure that the division is fair ex-ante.
While approximate or ex-ante fairness are reasonable when allocating low-value objects, such as
seats in a course or in a school, they are not suitable for high-value objects, e.g., houses or precious
jewels. Think of a divorcing couple deciding how to split children, or two siblings who have to
divide three houses among them; it is unlikely that one of them will agree to receive a bundle that
is envy-free except one child/house, or a lottery that gives either one or two with equal probability.
In practical cases, when monetary transfers are undesired, the common solution is to find a way
to share some of the objects. For example, a shop can be jointly owned by several partners, sharing
the costs and revenues of operation. A house can be jointly owned by several people, who live
in the house alternately in different times. While such sharing may be inevitable if exact fairness
is desired, it may be quite inconvenient due to the overhead in managing the shared property.
Therefore, it is desirable to minimize the number of objects that have to be shared.
Our contribution. The paper advocates a new approach to the problem of fair division:
minimize the number of sharings under the constraints of fairness.
∗Ariel University (Israel), erelsgl@gmail.com
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This approach is a compelling alternative to approximate fairness when the objects to be divided
are highly valuable and sharing is technically possible (as in all examples above and many other
real-life situations) but unwanted.
We consider problems in which m objects have to be divided among n agents. The objects to
be divided may contain both goods and bads, as in the practice of partnership dissolution when
valuable assets are often divided together with liabilities. We assume that agents have additive
utilities, so the problem can be represented by a valuation matrix, recording the value of each
object to each agent. We focus on classic fairness notions such as proportionality (each agent gets
a bundle worth at least 1/n of the total value) or envy-freeness (each agent weakly prefers his/her
bundle to the bundle of any other agent).
In a companion paper (Sandomirskiy and Segal-Halevi, 2019), we assumed that there is an
additional requirement of fractional Pareto-optimality (fPO)— no other allocation, with or without
sharing, is at least as good for all agents and strictly better for some of them. This is a strong
requirement that has two implications:
1. An upper bound on the number of sharings: for every fPO utility-profile, there is an allocation
attaining this profile with at most n− 1 sharings.
2. An upper bound on the number of fPO allocations: when n is fixed, and the valuations are
non-degenerate (for every pair of agents, there are no two objects with the same value-ratio),
the number of fPO allocations is polynomial in m. Moreover, it is possible to enumerate all
such allocations in polynomial time.
These two implications allowed us to design an algorithm for finding an allocation that minimizes
the number of sharings, subject to being fPO and fair; the algorithm is polynomial in m for non-
degenerate valuations.
The present paper focuses on situations in which there is no requirement for fractional-PO.
There may be two reasons for dropping the fPO requirement:
• Allowing allocations with fewer sharings. The agents may prefer a fair allocation with few
sharings to a fair+fPO allocation with many sharings.
• Allowing truthful mechanisms. It is known that no truthful mechanism can guarantee both
fairness and Pareto-efficiency (see Section 5); it may be desired to give up efficiency to get
truthfulness.
In order to take advantage of these new possibilities, new techniques are needed.
1. For an upper bound on the number of sharings, we can use a different technique based on
linear programming. This technique gives us an upper bound of between (n− 1) and (n− 1)2
sharings, depending on the desired fairness criterion.
2. In contrast, there is no polynomial upper bound on the number of fair allocations, even with
non-degenerate valuations. In fact, we show that minimizing the number of sharings subject to
fairness is NP-hard even with two agents, with either degenerate or non-degenerate valuations.
The results from both papers are summarized and compared in Table 1.
Sharing minimization without fPO is significantly harder than with fPO; that is why the present
paper contains more open problems than solutions.
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Valuations
Allocation Sharings Identical Non-degenerate
Proportional at most n− 1 O(mn log n) [Sec.3]
minimal NP-hard [T4.2]
Envy-free at most n− 1 O((n +m)4 log(n+m)) [Sec.3*]
minimal NP-hard [T4.2]
Equitable at most n− 1 Weakly-polynomial [Sec.3]
minimal ???
Consensus at most n(n− 1) Weakly-polynomial [Sec.5]
minimal NP-hard [T5.2]
Fair and dPO at most n− 1 ???
minimal NP-hard [T4.2]
Fair and fPO at most n− 1 O(poly(m)) when n fixed [*]
minimal NP-hard [*] O(poly(m)) when n fixed [*]
Table 1: Run-time complexity of allocating m objects among n agents (where n is fixed), with a
bound on the number of sharings. Results denoted by [*] are from Sandomirskiy and Segal-Halevi
(2019).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Agents, objects, and allocations
There is a set [n] = {1, . . . , n} of n agents and a set [m] = {1, . . . ,m} of m divisible objects. A
bundle x of objects is a vector (xo)o∈[m] ∈ [0, 1]
m, where the component xo represents the portion
of o in the bundle (the total amount of each object is normalized to 1).
Each agent i ∈ [n] has an additive utility function over bundles: ui(x) =
∑
o∈[m] vi,o · xo. Here
vi,o ∈ R is agent i’s value of receiving the whole object o ∈ [m]; the matrix v = (vi,o)i∈[n],o∈[m] is
called the valuation matrix ; it encodes the information about agents’ preferences and is used below
as the input of fair division algorithms. The total value of agent i to all objects is denoted by
Vi :=
∑
o∈[m] vi,o.
We make no assumptions on valuation matrix v and allow values of mixed signs: for example,
the same object o can bring positive value to some agents and negative to others.
An allocation z is a collection of bundles (zi)i∈[n], one for each agent, with the condition that all
the objects are fully allocated. An allocation can be identified with the matrix z := (zi,o)i∈[n],o∈[m]
such that all zi,o ≥ 0 and
∑
i∈[n] zi,o = 1 for each o ∈ [m].
Fairness and efficiency concepts The two fundamental notions of fairness, taking preferences
of agents into account, are envy-freeness and a weaker concept of proportionality (also known as
equal split lower bound or fair share guarantee).
An allocation z = (zi)i∈[n] is called proportional if each agent prefers her bundle to the equal
division: ∀i ∈ [n] ui(zi) ≥ Vi/n.
An allocation z is called envy-free (EF) if every agent prefers her bundle to the bundles of
others. Formally, for all i, j ∈ [n]: ui(zi) ≥ ui(zj). Every envy-free allocation is also proportional;
with n = 2 agents, envy-freeness and proportionality are equivalent.
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An allocation z is called equitable if it gives each agent exactly the same relative value, defined
as the value of the bundle divided by the total value: ∀i, j ∈ [n]: ui(zi)/Vi = uj(zj)/Vj .
The idea that the objects must be allocated in the efficient, non-improvable way is captured by
Pareto-optimality. An allocation z is Pareto-dominated by an allocation y if y gives at least the
same utility to all agents and strictly more to at least one of them.
An allocation z is fractionally Pareto-optimal (fPO) if it is not dominated by any feasible y. It
is discrete Pareto-optimal (dPO) if it is not dominated by any feasible y with yi,o ∈ {0, 1}. fPO
implies dPO but not vice-versa.
2.2 Measures of sharing
If for some i ∈ [n], zi,o = 1, then the object o is not shared — it is fully allocated to agent i.
Otherwise, object o is shared between two or more agents. Throughout the paper, we consider two
measures quantifying the amount of sharing in a given allocation z.
The simplest one is the number of shared objects:
∣∣ {o ∈ [m] : zi,o ∈ (0, 1) for some i ∈ [n]} ∣∣.
Alternatively, one can take into account the number of times each object is shared. This is captured
by the number of sharings
#sharz =
∑
o∈[m]
(∣∣{i ∈ [n] : zi,o > 0}∣∣− 1
)
=

∑
o∈[m]
∣∣{i ∈ [n] : zi,o > 0}∣∣

−m.
For “indivisible” allocations both measures are zero, but they differ, for example, if only one object
o is shared but each agent consumes a bit of o: the number of shared objects in this case is 1 while
the number of sharings is n−1. Clearly, the number of shared objects is always at most the number
of sharings.
3 Worst-case Bounds on Sharing
Several previous works have used combinatorial arguments to prove an upper bound of n−1 on the
number of sharings, given the additional requirement of fractional-PO (Bogomolnaia, Moulin, Sandomirskiy, and Yanovskaya,
2016, Barman and Krishnamurthy, 2018). Some of these results are generalized in the companion
paper (Sandomirskiy and Segal-Halevi, 2019).
Since the present paper does not require fPO, we present below an alternative proof that uses a
more general technique. The technique relies on the following known fact: a bounded feasible linear
program with k constraints has a basic feasible solution — a solution in which at most k variables
are non-zero (Matousek and Ga¨rtner, 2007). The technique was first applied to fair division by
Wilson (1998). The theorem below generalizes his results.
Theorem 3.1. For any feasible allocation z∗:
(a) There exists a feasible allocation z with at most n sharings in which each agent receives
exactly the same utility: ∀i ∈ [n] : ui(zi) = ui(z
∗
i). The n is tight even for shared objects.
(b) There exists a feasible allocation z with at most n− 1 sharings in which each agent receives
at least as much utility: ∀i ∈ [n] : ui(zi) ≥ ui(z
∗
i). The n− 1 is tight even for shared objects.
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Proof. For each i ∈ [n], define the constant Ui := ui(z
∗
i ).
(a) The allocation z can be found using an LP in which the variables are the zio for all i ∈
[n], o ∈ [m], and the constraints (besides the non-negativity constraints zio ≥ 0) are:
• m feasibility constraints:
∑n
i=1 zio = 1 for all o ∈ [m].
• n value constraints:
∑m
o=1 viozio = Ui for all i ∈ [n].
It is feasible (z∗ satisfies it) and has m+ n constraints, so it has a solution z in which at most
m + n variables are non-zero:
∑
o∈[m]
(∣∣{i ∈ [n] : zi,o > 0}∣∣) ≤ m + n. By definition of sharing,
#sharz ≤ (m+ n)−m = n.
For tightness, consider an instance with n agents and n goods, where agent i values good i at
n2 − n+ 1 and the other n− 1 goods at 1. Let z∗ be the allocation giving each agent 1/n of each
good. This allocation has n sharings and gives each agent a utility of exactly n. But no allocation
with less than n shared objects can attain exactly the same utilities: if object i is given entirely to
agent i, then agent i’s utility is more than n; if it is given entirely to another agent, then agent i’s
utility is at most n− 1.
(b) The above LP can be modified by removing the constraint for agent n, and maximizing
agent n’s utility instead:
maximize
m∑
o=1
vnozno (3.1)
subject to
n∑
i=1
zio = 1 for o ∈ [m]
m∑
o=1
viozio = Ui for i ∈ [n− 1]
zio ≥ 0 for i ∈ [n], o ∈ [m]
It has a feasible solution (z∗) in which the objective value is Un, so in every optimal solution the
utility of agent n is at least Un and the utility of each agent i < n is exactly Ui. The LP has
m+n−1 constraints, so it has a solution z with at most m+n−1 non-zeros. This solution satisfies
#sharz ≤ (m+ n− 1)−m = n− 1.
For tightness, consider an instance with n agents and n − 1 goods whose value for all agents
is n. Let z∗ be the allocation that gives each agent 1/n of each good. This allocation has n − 1
sharings and gives each agent a utility of n− 1. But in any allocation with less than n− 1 shared
objects, at least one object is given entirely to some agent, and thus the remaining n − 1 agents
must share a total value of at most (n − 2)n < (n − 1)(n − 1); thus at least one remaining agent
gets less than (n− 1).
Note that Theorem 3.1 holds whether the valuations are positive, negative or mixed.
Theorem 3.1 raises the computational question of how to find an allocation satisfying the worst-
case upper bound on sharing. The simplex method finds such solutions for any LP, and it may
be sufficient for all practical purposes, but its worst-case run-time is exponential. Khachiyan
(1980) showed that the ellipsoid method can be used to find an optimal basic feasible solution in
weakly-polynomial time, but its practical performance is not very good. Interior-point methods
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perform better both theoretically and practically, but they may find an interior solution (with many
nonzeros) rather than a basic feasible solution. Megiddo (1991) gives a strongly-polynomial time
that, given a pair of optimal solutions for the primal and dual problems, finds an optimal basic
feasible solution.1 Bixby and Saltzman (1994) give a different algorithm for the same task, that
performs well in practice but does not have good worst-case run-time guarantees.
All the above algorithms still require a solution to the original LP, for which we currently have
only weakly-polynomial algorithms. In some special cases, more efficient algorithms are possible.
Proportionality. With z∗ the allocation giving each agent 1/n of each object, part (b) implies
the existence of a proportional allocation with at most n − 1 sharings. Such an allocation can be
found efficiently by reduction to cake-cutting. Arrange the objects arbitrarily on an interval, where
each object corresponds to a homogeneous sub-interval. A connected partition makes n − 1 cuts
and hence at most n− 1 objects are shared. When all valuations are positive or all valuations are
negative, a connected proportional allocation can be found using O(mn log(n)) operations by the
Even-Paz protocol (Even and Paz, 1984). When the valuations are mixed, a connected proportional
allocation can be found using using O(mn2) operations by the Last Diminisher protocol (Steinhaus,
1948).
Envy-freeness. The existence of envy-free allocations with at most n−1 sharing does not follow
directly from Theorem 3.1. For all-positive or all-negative valuations, it can be deduced by a
reduction to the problem of envy-free cake-cutting with connected pieces (similarly to the reduction
for proportionality). The existence of such allocations was proved by Stromquist (1980) and Su
(1999). For general cakes, connected envy-free allocations cannot be found using a finite number of
queries (Stromquist, 2008). However, for piecewise-homogeneous cakes, such as the ones generated
from the above reduction, Alijani, Farhadi, Ghodsi, Seddighin, and Tajik (2017) show an algorithm
that finds such allocations in time O(mn); we do not know whether polynomial-time algorithms
exist.
Another way to deduce the existence of envy-free allocations with n − 1 sharings, as ex-
plained in the companion paper, is from results on existence of a competitive equilibrium (CE)
with equal incomes (EI). A CEEI is always envy-free. Moreover, competitive equilibria satisfy
the property of Pareto-indifference: if z∗ is a CE and z gives the same utilities to all agents,
then z is a CE too. Existence of CE for problems with arbitrary mixed valuations was proved
in Bogomolnaia, Moulin, Sandomirskiy, and Yanovskaya (2017). But, polynomial-time algorithms
for computing CE are known only for restricted cases:
• For strictly-positive valuations, Orlin (2010) shows an algorithm that finds a CE in O((n +
m)4 log(n +m)) operations.
• For negative valuations, Branzei and Sandomirskiy (2019) show an algorithm that finds a CE
in O
(
m
n(n−1)
2
+3
)
operations.
Equitability. It is easy to write an LP that finds an equitable allocation in which the equitable
value is maximized (Wilson, 1998). The existence of such an allocation with n − 1 sharings does
1 The above references are based on an answer by Kevin Dalmeijer from Operations Research Stack Exchange
(https://or.stackexchange.com/a/3129/2576).
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not follow directly from Theorem 3.1(b). However, the same LP that finds the maximum equitable
value already has m+ n− 1 constraints:
• m feasibility constraints;
• n− 1 equitability constraints:
∑
m
o=1 viozio
Vi
=
∑
m
o=1 vnozno
Vn
for all i ∈ [n− 1].
Hence a max-equitable allocation with n−1 sharings exists. Currently, we do not know a strongly-
polynomial algorithm for finding such an allocation.
Different entitlements. All fairness properties can be generalized to situations in which agents
have different entitlements. For each i ∈ [n], let ti denote the entitlement of agent i, where∑n
i=1 ti = 1. Then an allocation z is proportional if for all i ∈ [n] : ui(zi) ≥ ti·
∑
o∈[m] vi,o, envy-free if
for all i, j ∈ [n]: ui(zi)/ti ≥ ui(zj)/tj , and equitable if for all i, j ∈ [n]: ui(zi)/(Viti) = uj(zj)/(Vjtj).
With z∗ the allocation giving each agent i a fraction ti of each resource, Theorem 3.1(b) implies
the existence of a proportional allocation with at most n − 1 sharings. However, in contrast
to the case of equal entitlements, it is not possible to compute such an allocation by reduction to
cake-cutting, since for some vectors of entitlements, there may be no connected cake-allocation that
satisfies the generalized proportionality property (Segal-Halevi, 2019, Crew, Narayanan, and Spirkl,
2019).
Existence for both proportionality and envy-freeness can be derived from the existence of a
CE with different incomes: when the income of each agent i is ti, any CE is both envy-free and
proportional.
Open problem 1. All computational results stated above are derived by adding strong constraints,
such as connectivity or competitive-equilibrium. It is very reasonable that without these constraints
faster algorithms are possible. What is the run-time complexity of finding an allocation with at
most n− 1 sharings that is:
(a) Proportional?
(b) Envy-free?
(c) Equitable?
(d) Proportional/envy-free/equitable with different entitlements?
4 Minimizing the Sharing
In the worst case a fair division might require n− 1 sharings, but in some cases it may be possible
to find a fair allocation with fewer sharings. For general linear programs, finding a solution with
a minimal number of nonzero variables is known to be NP-hard and hard to approximate (see
Appendix A). But this does not rule out the possibility of minimizing the number of nonzero
variables in specific linear programs related to fairness. This invokes the following decision problem.
Definition 4.1. Given integers n ≥ 2 and s ∈ {0, . . . , n− 2}, FairBoundedSharing(n, s) is the
problem of deciding if a given instance with n agents admits a fair division with at most s sharings.
FairBoundedSharing(n, s) is obviously in NP. Moreover, FairBoundedSharing(n, 0) is
obviously NP-hard, since we can reduce Partition to an instance of FairBoundedSharing(n, 0)
in which all agents have identical valuations.
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Number-goods Personal-goods Total
o ∈ {1, . . . , p} o ∈ {p+ 1, . . . , p + n− 2}
Alice ao T nT
Bob ao + bo T − co nT
n− 2 “personal agents” ei,o n · T − 1/2 nT
Table 2: Values for proof of Theorem 4.2.
In the companion paper (Sandomirskiy and Segal-Halevi, 2019), we considered the related prob-
lem FpoBoundedSharing(n, s) — deciding if a given instance with n agents admits a fair and
fractionally-PO division with at most s sharings. Here, too, FpoBoundedSharing(n, 0) is
NP-hard by the same reduction from Partition, since when all agents have identical valuations,
all allocations are fPO. However, contrary to intuition, we revealed that the case of identical
valuations is computationally the hardest case: if the valuations are “sufficiently different” then
FpoBoundedSharing(n, s) can be decided in time O(poly(m)) when n is fixed. “Sufficiently
different” means that for every two agents i, j ∈ [n] and two objects o, p ∈ [m], the value-ratios
are different: vi,o/vj,o 6= vi,p/vj,p (a condition called non-degeneracy). Note that, in the space
of all value-matrices, the subset of degenerate matrices has a measure of zero; the hard case of
identical valuations is a knife-edge case. Informally one can say that “almost all instances of
FpoBoundedSharing(n, s) are easy” (= decidable in polynomial time when n is fixed).
Is it also true that “almost all instances of FairBoundedSharing(n, s) are easy”? Below we
show that the answer is no: when the fPO requirement is removed, or even just weakened to dPO,
computational hardness strikes already for two agents, even for non-degenerate valuations.
4.1 Finding a fair allocation with zero sharings
Theorem 4.2. For any integer n ≥ 2, the problem FairBoundedSharing(n, 0) is NP-complete
even for non-degenerate and strictly-positive valuations.
Proof. By reduction from Partition. Given a Partition instance with p positive integers,
a1, . . . , ap, with
∑p
i=1 ai = 2T , construct a fair division problem with m = p + (n − 2) goods:
p “number goods” and n − 2 “personal goods”. There are n agents with the following valuations
(see Table 2):
• Alice values each number-good o ∈ {1, . . . , p} at ao, and each personal-good o ∈ {p+1, . . . ,m}
at T . Hence Alice’s total value is n · T .
• Bob values each number good o ∈ {1, . . . , p} at ao + bo and each personal good o ∈ {p +
1, . . . ,m} at T −co, where the bo and co are small strictly-positive perturbations selected such
that the valuations are non-degenerate, and
∑p
o=1 bo =
∑m
o=p+1 co = 1/2. Bob’s total value
is thus (2T + 1/2) + ((n − 2)T − 1/2) = n · T too.
• There are n−2 “personal agents”, each of whom values a unique personal good at n ·T −1/2
and all other goods at some small positive number ei,o (different for each agent), such that
the sum of all such numbers is 1/2 and the total value is n · T .
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If there exists an equal-sum partition of the numbers a1, . . . , ap into two subsets (X1,X2), then
there exists an allocation of the goods with no sharings:
• Bob takes either X1 or X2 for which his value is higher;
• Alice takes either X2 or X1 for which Bob’s value is lower;
• Each personal agent takes its unique personal good.
The allocation is envy-free, hence also proportional:
• Alice does not envy, since she values all n bundles at exactly T .
• Bob does not envy Alice since he values his bundle more then hers; he does not envy the
other agents, since his bundle is worth more than T and the personal goods are worth for
him less than T .
• The personal agents do not envy since they value their personal goods at n · T − 1/2 and the
other bundles at less than 1/2.
Conversely, suppose there exists a proportional allocation (obviously the same argument holds if
there exists an envy-free allocation). In any proportional allocation, each agent must get a value
of at least T . Therefore each personal good must be given to its corresponding agent. Now, both
Alice and Bob must be given a value of at least T from the p number goods. We claim that Alice’s
value must be exactly T . This is because, if Alice’s value is at least T + 1, then Alice’s valuation
of Bob’s bundle is at most T − 1. But the difference between Alice’s and Bob’s values is at most
1/2, so Bob’s value of his own bundle is at most T − 1/2, contradicting proportionality. Hence, the
bundles of Alice and Bob correspond to an equal partition of the numbers a1, . . . , ap.
Remark 4.3. The hardness remains even if we add the requirement of discrete PO. It is sufficient
to adapt the first part of the above proof: we have to prove that, if there exists an equal-sum
partition of the numbers, then there exists a dPO+EF allocation of the goods with no sharings.
Let z be the EF allocation constructed in the proof. If z is also dPO then we are done.
Otherwise, let y be a dPO allocation that Pareto-dominates z. We claim that y is EF too:
• Since y dominates z, each of the n−2 personal-agents must have a value of at least nT −1/2,
so he must still get his personal-good. Hence, the personal agents still do not envy. This also
implies that Alice and Bob still get all and only the number-goods.
• Alice’s value must be at least T . Hence, her valuation of Bob’s bundle is at most T , so Alice
does not envy.
• Bob’s value must be at large as his value in z, so Bob’s valuation of Alice’s bundle is at most
as large as in z, so Bob does not envy too.
In any case, there exists an envy-free+proportional+dPO allocation with no sharings.
9
Number-goods Personal-goods Common-good Total
o ∈ {1, . . . , p} o ∈ {p + 1, . . . ,m− 1} o = m
Alice ao T (s+ 1)T nT
Bob ao + bo T − co (s+ 1)T − co nT
n− s− 3 “personal agents” ei,o n · T − 1/2 ei,o nT
s+ 1 “common agents” fi,o fi,o n · T − 1/2 nT
Table 3: Values for proof of Theorem 4.4.
4.2 Finding a fair allocation with one or more sharings
With n = 2 agents, Theorem 4.2 completely characterizes the computational hardness of sharing
minimization: a fair allocation with 1 sharing always exists, and deciding whether a fair allocation
with 0 sharings exists is NP-hard.
With n ≥ 3 agents, the problem of sharing minimization becomes richer, since the minimum
number of sharings in a given instance can be anything between 0 and n − 1. The smallest case
that is not covered by Theorem 4.2 is FairBoundedSharing(3, 1).
Somewhat surprisingly, in the case of identical valuations, FairBoundedSharing(3, 1) can
be solved in polynomial time; this was recently proved by Mikhail Rudoy.2 For n ≥ 4 and
s ∈ {1, . . . , n − 2}, the computational complexity of FairBoundedSharing(n, s) with identical
valuations is still open.
When the valuations are not identical, the hardness result of Theorem 4.2 can be partially
generalized.
Theorem 4.4. For any integers n ≥ 3 and s ∈ {0, . . . , n − 3}, FairBoundedSharing(n, s) is
NP-complete for any degeneracy degree, and even when all valuations are strictly-positive.
Proof. We adapt the reduction in the proof of Theorem 4.2 as follows. There are m = p+n− s− 2
goods: p “number goods” and n − s − 3 “personal goods” and 1 “common good”. There are n
agents: Alice, Bob, n − s − 3 “personal agents” and s + 1 “common agents”. Alice and Bob still
value mainly the number goods; each personal-agent still values mainly its unique personal-good;
and the new common-agents value only the single common-good. The valuations are described in
Table 3, where ao, bo, co, ei,o, fi,o are small perturbations (as in the proof of Theorem 4.2) selected
such that the desired degeneracy degree is attained and that the total value for each agent is n · T .
If there exists an equal-sum partition of the numbers a1, . . . , ap into two subsets (X1,X2), then
there exists an allocation of the goods with exactly s sharings:
• Bob takes either X1 or X2 for which his value is higher;
• Alice takes either X2 or X1 for which Bob’s value is lower;
• Each of the s+ 1 common agents receives a fraction 1
s+1 of the common good;
• Each of the n− s− 3 personal agent receives its unique personal good.
2 https://cstheory.stackexchange.com/a/42316/9453
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The allocation is envy-free, hence also proportional; the proof is the same as for Theorem 4.2.
Conversely, suppose there exists a proportional allocation with s sharings (obviously the same
argument holds if there exists an envy-free allocation). In any proportional allocation, each agent
must get a value of at least T . The only way to give such a value to the common agents is to give
each of them a fraction of the common good. Hence, the common good must be shared among the
s + 1 common agents. This generates s sharings, so the other goods must be allocated with no
sharing. Each personal good must be given to its corresponding personal agent, and the number-
goods must be shared between Alice and Bob. Similarly to Theorem 4.2, the bundles of Alice and
Bob correspond to an equal partition of the numbers a1, . . . , ap.
Theorem 4.4 leaves open the case s = n− 2. The smallest open case is n = 3 and s = 1.
Open problem 2. What is the run-time complexity of FairBoundedSharing(3, 1)? of Fair-
BoundedSharing(n, n− 2) for any n ≥ 3?
Table 4 illustrates the results and open cases for n ∈ {2, 3, 4}.
Note that Theorem 4.4 considers the number of sharings. If we are interested in the number
of shared goods instead, then in the reduction, we should replace the single common-good with s
common-goods, each of which is valued by all common-agents at approximately (n · T − 1/2)/s.
In any envy-free allocation, all s common-goods must be shared by all s + 1 common-agents, so
that they do not envy each other. This proves that EnvyFreeBoundedSharedObjects(n, s)
is NP-hard. However, the proof does not work for proportionality, so the run-time complexity of
ProportionalBoundedSharedObjects(n, s) is still open.
Open problem 3. Given n ≥ 3 and s ∈ {1, . . . , n−2}, what is the run-time complexity of deciding
whether a given n-agent instance admits a proportional allocation with at most s shared objects?
5 Truthful fair division
A division algorithm is truthful if for every agent i, it is a weakly-dominant strategy to report the
true values (vi,o)o∈[m]. Truthfulness, fairness, and Pareto-optimality are incompatible, see Zhou
(1990). However, truthfulness can be achieved by introducing some inefficiencies. This section
surveys several such truthful mechanisms and checks whether any of them can be adapted to
minimize the sharing.
5.1 Consensus allocation mechanism
Mossel and Tamuz (2010) present a truthful randomized mechanism which uses a consensus alloca-
tion. An allocation z is called a consensus allocation if for every two agents i, j ∈ [n]: ui(zj) = Vi/n,
where Vi =
∑
o∈[m] vi,o. Given a consensus allocation z, a permutation pi over [n] is selected uni-
formly at random, and the bundle zpi(i) is allocated to agent i. Thus, the expected utility of any
agent i, whether truthful or not, is Vi/n, so the agent cannot gain by false reporting. Moreover,
a truthful agent gets a utility of exactly Vi/n with certainty, while a non-truthful agent might get
more or less than Vi/n. So for a risk-averse agent, truthfulness is a strictly dominant strategy.
At first glance, consensus allocation requires to share all m goods. However, when n ≪ m we
can do substantially better.
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Valuations
Allocation Agents (n) Sharings (s) Identical Degenerate Non-degenerate
Fair 2
1 O(m) [Sec.3]
0 NP-complete [Thm.4.2]
Fair 3
2 Proportional: O(m) [Sec.3]. Envy-free: poly(m)
1 poly(m) [ftn.2] ???
0 NP-complete [Thm.4.2]
Fair 4
3 Proportional: O(m) [Sec.3]. Envy-free: poly(m)
2 ???
1 ??? NP-complete [Thm.4.4]
0 NP-complete [Thm.4.2]
Fair+fPO [*] 2
1 O(poly(m)) [*]
0 NP-complete [*] O(poly(m)) [*]
Fair+fPO [*] 3
2 O(poly(m)) [*]
1 poly(m) [ftn.2] ??? O(poly(m)) [*]
0 NP-complete [*] O(poly(m)) [*]
Fair+fPO [*] 4
3 O(poly(m)) [*]
2 ??? O(poly(m)) [*]
1 ??? O(poly(m)) [*]
0 NP-complete [*] O(poly(m)) [*]
Table 4: Run-time complexity of dividing m goods among n agents, for small values of n. The
“degenerate” column refers to valuations that are not identical, but not non-degenerate (for exam-
ple, two valuations are identical and the third is different). For comparison, we show results for
fairness+fPO from Sandomirskiy and Segal-Halevi (2019), denoted by [*].
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Theorem 5.1. In any instance with n agents, there exists a consensus allocation with at most
n(n− 1) sharings. The n(n− 1) is tight even for shared objects.
Proof. The proof is similar to Theorem 3.1 and is based on an LP with the following constraints:
• m feasibility constraints;
• n(n− 1) consensus constraints:
∑
o∈[m] vi,ozj,o = Vi/n for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [n− 1].
Note that for j = n the equality holds automatically. Since there are m + n(n − 1) constraints,
there exists a basic feasible solution with at most n(n− 1) sharings.
For tightness, consider an instance with n agents and n(n− 1) goods. For each agent, (n − 1)
of the goods are “big” and the other (n− 1)2 goods are “small”. Each agent values each of his big
goods at n − 0.5 and each of his small goods at 0.5/(n − 1). All n sets of big goods are pairwise-
disjoint, so that each good is “big” for exactly one agent and “small” for all other agents. For each
agent, the sum of all values is n(n−1), so in a consensus allocation, the value of each bundle should
be exactly n− 1. However, the value of each big good to its agent is larger than n− 1, so all goods
must be shared.
Open problem 4. Can we find in strongly-polynomial time, a consensus allocation with at most
n(n− 1) sharings?
Finding a consensus allocation with minimal sharing is NP-hard when the valuations may
be identical, by reduction from Partition. Moreover, it is NP-hard even with non-degenerate
valuations.
Theorem 5.2. Deciding whether a given instance admits a consensus allocation with no sharings
is NP-complete, even with non-degenerate valuations.
Proof. Membership in NP is obvious. For hardness, we reduce from DistinctBalancedParti-
tion — a variant of Partition in which the input integers must be distinct and the output parts
must have the same cardinality. See Appendix B for a proof that it is NP-hard. Given a Dis-
tinctBalancedPartition instance a1, . . . , a2p with
∑2p
i=1 ai = 2S. Pick any number b ∈ (0,
1
4p).
Create a fair division problem with m = 2p goods and two agents with the following valuations:
• Alice values each good o ∈ {1, . . . , 2p} at ao.
• Bob values each good o ∈ {1, . . . , 2p} at ao + b.
For each object o, the value-ratio is 1 + b/ao. Since all the numbers ao are distinct, the resulting
valuations are non-degenerate.
Let (X1,X2) be a partition of the numbers a1, . . . , a2p into two subsets with equal sum and equal
cardinality, |X1| = |X2| = p. In the induced partition of the objects, we have uA(X1) = uA(X2) = S
and uB(X1) = uB(X2) = S + p · b, so it is a consensus allocation. Conversely, let (XA,XB) be a
consensus allocation of the objects. Since uA(XA) = uA(XB) = S, the induced partition of the
integers has an equal sum. Since uB(XA) = uB(XB) = S+p · b, and b is sufficiently small, we must
have |XA| = |XB | = p, so the induced partition of the integers has equal cardinality.
Open problem 5. The hardness proof of Theorem 5.2 is weaker than that of Theorem 4.2, since
it uses only a one-dimensional perturbation. It does not rule out the possibility that all instances
except a subset of measure zero are easy.
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Combining the algorithm of Mossel and Tamuz (2010) with Theorem 5.1 gives:
Corollary 5.3. There exists a randomized truthful algorithm that (with certainty) returns an envy-
free allocation with at most n(n− 1) sharings.
5.2 Partial-allocation and strong-demand mechanisms
Cole, Gkatzelis, and Goel (2013a) suggest a different approach to truthful fair division, called Par-
tial Allocation Mechanism (PAM). Their benchmark for fairness is the competitive equilibrium with
equal incomes (CEEI), that we already mentioned in Section 3.3 It is known that, for linear ad-
ditive valuations, CEEI is equivalent to the Nash-optimal allocation — the allocation maximizing
the product of the agents’ utilities. Informally, PAM works as follows.
1. Find a CEEI allocation z∗.
2. For each agent i, compute the ratio fi between the product of the other agents’ utilities when
i is present, and the product of their utilities when i is not present.
3. Give to each agent i the bundle fi · z
∗
i
(that is, a fraction fi of each good i receives in the
original CEEI).
They prove that, under reasonable assumptions, fi ≥ 1/e ≈ 0.368, so each agent is guaranteed at
least 36.8% of his/her CEEI utility.
As explained in Section 3, there always exists a CEEI allocation with at most n − 1 sharings.
However, the process of giving each agent i only a fraction fi of each object is, arguably, equivalent to
forcing the agent to share each and every object (e.g. with the mechanism designer, the government
or the public). Therefore, it seems that PAM is not compatible with sharing minimization.
Cole et al. (2013a) present a different mechanism called Strong Demand Mechanism (SDM),
which is particularly efficient when there are many agents and few goods (as in the case of coupon-
based privatization). SDM gives to each agent a fraction of a single good, so all objects are shared.
Hence, SDM too does not seem compatible with sharing minimization.
Remark 5.4. For the case of two agents, Cole, Gkatzelis, and Goel (2013b) present a mechanism
called MAX, which runs both the consensus-allocation mechanism and the partial-allocation mech-
anism and returns the outcome with the highest social welfare. They prove that this combination
is still truthful and guarantees at least 2/3 of the optimal social welfare.
5.3 Mechanism for binary valuations
In the problem of fair cake-cutting, most positive results for truthful allocation are designed for
the special case in which the agents have piecewise-uniform valuations. the cake is assumed to be
an interval; each agent i desires a finite set of sub-intervals of the cake, and does not care about
the rest of the cake. For this setting, Chen, Lai, Parkes, and Procaccia (2013) present a truthful
mechanism that guarantees envy-freeness and Pareto-optimality. Informally, the CLPP mechanism
proceeds as follows.
1. For each subset S of agents, calculate their average length — the total length of intervals
desired by at least one member of S.
3They call CEEI the Proportionally-Fair allocation.
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2. Pick an S with a smallest average length (breaking ties arbitrarily);
3. Allocate to the members of S, all their desired sub-intervals, such that each member of S
gets a value of exactly the average length (this means that all the desired sub-intervals are
allocated to agents who desire them).
4. Divide the remaining cake recursively among the remaining agents.
5. Discard all parts of the cake that are undesired by any agent.
In our setting, piecewise-uniform valuations means that each agent assigns to each object a value
of either 1 or 0. Under this assumption, an agent cares only about the total amount he/she gets
from desired objects. Therefore, in step 3, the allocation can be implemented using at most |S| − 1
sharings. When S is the set of all agents, the allocation requires n − 1 sharings, which is the
worst-case upper bound on any fair division.
Corollary 5.5. For binary valuations, there exists a deterministic truthful algorithm that (with
certainty) returns an envy-free and Pareto-optimal allocation with at most n− 1 sharings.
Open problem 6. In some situations, it may be possible to attain the same allocation as the
CLPP mechanism with less than n− 1 sharings. Is it possible to minimize the amount of sharing,
while keeping the mechanism truthful, envy-free and Pareto-optimal?
5.4 More truthful mechanisms
There are other truthful fair allocation mechanisms. We plan to study them in the future.
6 Related Work
Related work is surveyed in Sandomirskiy and Segal-Halevi (2019).
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APPENDIX
A Linear Programming and Bounded Sharings
The above proof raises the question of whether the minimization problem (finding an allocation
minimizing the number of sharings) can also be found using LP techniques. For this, it could
be very helpful to have an algorithm for finding the smallest number of nonzero variables in a
given LP. This problem is called Min-RVLS — Minimum Relevant Variables in a Linear System.
Unfortunately, Min-RVLS is NP-hard, and it is also hard to find multiplicative approximations to
the minimum (Amaldi and Kann, 1998).
Moreover, even finding a very modest additive approximation is NP-hard:
Theorem A.1. Unless P=NP, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that accepts as input a linear
program with k constraints and decides whether it has a feasible solution with at most k−1 nonzero
variables.
Proof. The proof is by reduction from Partition. Suppose we are given k numbers a1, . . . , ak
whose total sum is 2S, and have to decide whether they can be partitioned into two subsets such
that the sum in each subset is s. We can solve this problem using a linear program with 2k variables.
For each i ∈ [2] and j ∈ [k], the variable xij determines what fraction of the number aj is in subset
i. There are k + 1 constraints (besides non-negativity):
• For each j ∈ [k]: x1j + x2j = 1.
• The equal-sum constraint:
∑m
j=1 x1jaj =
∑m
j=1 x2jaj
There always exists a solution with at most k + 1 nonzeros. In this solution, at most one number
is “cut” between the sets. Indeed, it is easy to solve the partition problem if we are allowed to cut
one number: just order the numbers on a line and cut the line into two parts with equal sum.
Now, if we could solve the “few nonzeros” problem, then we could decide whether the above
LP has a solution with at most k nonzeros, which would imply a solution to the partition problem
(in which no number is cut).
Remark A.2. Partition is considered “the easiest NP-hard problem” and there are several
algorithms that solve it very fast in practice (Schreiber, Korf, and Moffitt, 2018). So, while “few
nonzeros” is NP-hard, it may still be easy in practice. Alternatively, it may be possible to reduce
to “few nonzeros” from a harder NP-hard problem; its exact hardness is still open.
B NP-hardness of Distinct-Balanced-Partition
In the DistinctBalancedPartition problem, the input is 2m distinct positive integers with sum
2T , and the goal is to decide whether there is a subset of m integers that sum up to T .
Theorem B.1. DistinctBalancedPartition is NP-hard.
Proof. There is a known reduction from Partition to DistinctPartition.4 We now show a
reduction from DistinctPartition to DistinctBalancedPartition. Let the positive integers
4 See Yuval Filmus’ answer here: https://cs.stackexchange.com/a/13032/1342
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a1, . . . , an be an instance of DistinctPartition, and assume that their sum is 2S. We create an
instance of DistinctBalancedPartition with the following numbers:
• n big numbers: 3n+1 · ai for each i ∈ [n].
• 3n small numbers: n triplets of numbers, where triplet i contains 3i and two integers whose
sum is 3i, for example: (1, 2, 3), (4, 5, 9), (13, 14, 27), (40, 41, 81), . . ..
In the new instance, there are 4n numbers; the sum of the big numbers is 2 · 3n+1 · S and the sum
of the small numbers is 3n+1 − 3, so the goal is to find a subset of m = 2n numbers with a sum of
T = 3n+1 · S + (3n+1 − 3)/2.
Note that all big numbers are distinct (since all ai are), all small numbers are distinct as well
by the construction, and the largest small number (3n) is smaller than the smallest large number
(3n+1), so no two numbers coincide.
Every large number is a multiple of 3n+1, which is larger than the sum of all small numbers.
Hence, in every solution to theDistinctBalancedPartition instance, the sum of all big numbers
must be 3n+1 · S, so it constitutes a solution to the DistinctPartition.
Conversely, suppose we are given a solution to the DistinctPartition instance — a subset
X with |X| = k (for some k < n) and
∑
a∈X a = S. Without loss of generality, we assume that
k ≤ n/2, since otherwise we can just replace X with its complement, whose sum is S too.
We construct a solution to DistinctBalancedPartition by taking the k big numbers corre-
sponding to X, and adding 2n− k small numbers as follows:
• From the first k triplets of small numbers, we take the 3i;
• From the last n − k triplets of small numbers, we take the two smaller numbers whose sum
is 3i.
The number of elements in the generated set is k+k+(2n−2k) = 2n = m. The sum of the generated
set is 3n+1 ·S+(3n+1−3)/2 = T . Hence it is indeed a solution to DistinctBalancedPartition.
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